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Abstract
The covert processes in the interagency system in Anchorage
social services is the subject of this paper. The emphasis is on
(1) conflicts between explicit goals of planning and rationality in
social services and covert or hidden goals concerning protection of
organizational jurisdiction; (2) the structure of interagency power;
and (3) the socialization and regulation of member agencies' behavior.
The data for the study derive from focused interviews with agency
administrators and staff members and observations at community
planning meetings. The major finding of the study is that the
explicit goals of rationality, integration, and planning in social
services are subverted by other hidden goals concerning member
agencies' organizational survival interests. The domination of
these hidden goals shapes the interagency power, control, and
sanctioning system.
Introduction
Understanding the covert processes in the interagency system in
social services is the issue of this paper. The interagency system
refers here to both formal planning groups and informal but systematic interaction in the local social service community. The dominance of covert processes in the interagency system was revealed in
the course of research on the impact of Anchorage social agencies
on urban Alaska Natives (Eskimo, Indian, and Aleut).* As part of
that research, we examined the interagency system in terms of (1)
conflicts between explicit goals of planning and rationality in
social services and covert or hidden goals concerning protection of
organizational jurisdictions; (2) the structure of power; and (3)
socialization and regulation of members.
*This paper is adapted from one section of a report on the impact
of Anchorage social services on urban Natives (Jones, 1974). The
Anchorage social service study was funded under the Community Service
and Continuing Education Program, Title I, Higher Education Act of
1965.

Methods
Data for this paper, collected in Anchorage, Alaska in the
summer of 1973, derive from observations of four community planning
groups and interviews with thirty-three administrators and fortysix staff members, many of whom participated in these planning
groups. The four planning groups are: Ad Hoc Committee on Child
Abuse, Social Services Planning Group, Alcoholism Interagency Management Group, and Anchorage Manpower Planning Board. We used focused
interviews which were intensive and in-depth, lasting from one to
three hours; in some instances, informants were interviewed on two
or more occasions.
Goal Conflicts
Agency administrators and social workers representing administration are the primary participants in interagency planning in
Anchorage. Their actions in planning groups reflect the operation
of two sets of values. On the one hand, they are committed to the
professional goal of trying to increase the rationality and effectiveness of the social service system. This commitment prompts them
to initiate or to join in interagency planning. On the other hand,
they want to protect their own agency's jurisdiction. This interest
frequently induces them to oppose efforts to make services more
rational and effective. Individual participants usually resolve
this ambivalence by placing highest priority on planning goals when
their own agency jurisdictions are not threatened, and highest
priority on organizational survival interests when their territories
are endangered (Chetkow, 1967, 271-282, and Marris and Rein, 1969,
note the powerful influence of jurisdictional interests in planning).
Participants' fear that planning activities threaten their own
jurisdictions has a powerful influence on the planning process. It
is common for planning groups to assess the adequacy of member
agencies.
But this very act poses a threat. Although members of
an agency, let us say agency A, may be well aware of the inadequacies
and limitations of their services, they fear public exposure for
several reasons. First, public exposure carries the implication
that workers delivering the services are inept. Second, repeated
exposure could and has induced planning groups to recommend defunding
a service. This occurred in both the Alcoholism Interagency Management Group and the Manpower Planning Board. Third, exposing inadequacies of a service could prompt planning groups to sponsor the
establishment of a new agency for this purpose. The new agency may

-436-

perform the service better than agency A or it may assume responsibility for related services, in both cases, threatening to reduce
agency A's jurisdiction. These threats engender conflict between
and within individuals, reflecting the incompatibilities between the
rational goals of planning and hidden goals regarding members'
organizational survival interests.
The meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Child Abuse dramatically illustrate this conflict. The Committee was organized by
persons concerned about gaps and inadequacies in the child protection unit in public welfare. The unit is so understaffed that
workers must handle a substantial portion of their work by telephone. In addition, the unit suffers from a dearth of necessary
resources. The Ad Hoc Committee identified an acute need to organize the following supplementary services: hot line for families in
crisis, crisis nursery, emergency shelters, emergency foster homes,
and parent aides to stay in clients' homes and help families over
crises.
The central contest in the group was between representatives
of welfare and those who pressed for the establishment of supplementary services sponsored by other agencies. A borough health
department representative sought the Committee's approval for a
It
child protection unit to be administered by the borough.
included a child protection coordinator, crisis nursery, and family
aide program. A church-sponsored agency, Alaska Children's Services,
solicited Committee approval for a crisis hot line to be accompanied
by a mobile team that visited families in crisis on the spot.
The persistence with which representatives of welfare opposed
these proposals suggests the force of organizational survival interests when threats to jurisdiction are perceived. Welfare representatives countered every proposal with commonly asserted objections
-- new services would lead to a duplication of services, they would
confuse clients about which service to call in an emergency, they
would promote the use of untrained social workers (welfare workers
themselves are not trained social workers). When these arguments
failed to convince other members of the Committee, representatives
of welfare fell back on their legal authority to handle child abuse
cases, implying that the state would not grant authority to services
not sponsored by the welfare department. This veiled threat also
failed to convince proponents of new services. Finally, in a more
direct assertion, representatives of welfare urged the Committee to
adopt its goal of strengthening the existing welfare department
rather than starting competing services. No one objected in principle to strengthening the existing welfare service, but years of
experience convinced members that the need for adequate child protection services is so acute that it cannot await the outcome of
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the long, arduous, and usually hopeless process of changing the
rigid welfare system. The conflict between proponents of new child
protection services and representatives of welfare was not resolved
during the period of this research or for a relatively long period
after it.
Conflict Containment
Conflicts such as the above are perceived as very threatening
to group members, and they devote strenuous efforts to containing
it, at least in its overt manifestations. Participants' efforts to
contain the conflict take the form of avoiding issues that seriously
threaten group cohesion, focusing instead on less controversial and
less important issues. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) propose the
concept, "the non-decision" to characterize this process. This
pattern of conflict avoidance gives planning a ritualistic quality
where members go through the motions of planning with little consequence to the existing organization and delivery of social services
(Warren, 1973:361 makes a similar point).
In the four planning groups observed, if an issue threatened
to disrupt the group, members tabled it or handled it under the
table rather than to covertly confront it. Members generally inhibited expressions of hostility, treating each other with politeness
and respect regardless of animosities that smoldered beneath the
surface and that were confided during the research interviews. In
some instances, the congeniality observed reflected long standing
friendship ties between members. But more importantly, this style
of consensus politics reflected the reality that participants are
part of the same system and have to protect the same interests. If
one agency's jurisdiction can be reduced or weakened, then so can
any other's. So everyone tends to play the same political game for
fear their turn is coming. Thus, planning becomes a ritual rather
than a medium for reform.
The Structure of Power
Planning participants' complicity in maintaining consensus at
the costs of the express goals of planning seems to reflect their
recognition of the underlying realities of interagency power relations. While there is no formal, publically acknowledged power
structure in the interagency system, there is an informal, implicit
one stemming from the degree of dominance and subordination in
agencies' relations to each other. All agencies are interdependent
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in the sense that they rely on one another for continual flow of

referrals (customers) which nurtures the entire social service
industry. But there are also differences in degrees of dependence
between agencies. Agencies with very limited resources are more
dependent on agencies with large resources than vice versa. If the
limited agency antagonizes an agency with larger resources, the
latter can and does in some instances retaliate by refusing service
to its referrals. This practice is suggested by the ubiquitous care
with which administrators from small agencies avoid antagonizing
those from more powerful ones even though they may claim, in private
conversation, to abhor some of the practices of the more powerful
agencies. There is also verbal testimony to this practice. For
example, an aggressive program director in a recently established
alcoholism facility who is also a member of a minority group charged
complicity among some of the groups involved in alcohol treatment
who refused service to his referrals.
He believed this was due to
his having antagonized members of the Alcoholism Interagency Management Group by playing an outspoken, truth-telling role, thereby
challenging the style of consensus politics.
Agencies with large resources also exert control over other
agencies through manipulation of funds and contracts. The Bureau
of Indian Affairs and state welfare grant a number of contracts to
other agencies. If these agencies with contracts antagonize their
sponsors, they risk jeopardizing their funds. Negotiations at the
Ad Hoc Committee's meetings reflected this implicit power relationship. Members could not afford to antagonize public welfare for
three reasons. First, since most member agencies are small scale
and frequently refer to welfare, the success of their efforts
requires maintaining harmonious relations with welfare. Second,
some of the member agencies are directly funded by state welfare.
Third, the Committee depends for its very legitimacy on state welfare which has accorded it official status as the planning group
for child protection. The recognition of this underlying power
relationship profoundly shaped the outcome in Committee deliberations. Initial efforts to supplement welfare services in child
protection were rather quickly dropped, and the planning group
proceeded to deal with less threatening issues such as public
information. Thus, consensus politics was achieved.
Socialization and Regulation of Members
Up to this point, we have discussed goal conflicts and interagency power relations in formal planning groups. The socialization
and regulation of members is apparent not only in formal planning
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groups but also in informal but systematic interactions in the
social service community, which we consider part of the interagency system.
While members of established agencies seem to accept the
political realities of the interagency system, representatives of
newer agencies, such as the program director in the alcohol treatement facility, sometimes challenge them. The very existence of the
newer agencies bespeaks challenge; for example, Native-run social
agencies are in business precisely to redistribute social service
resources. Regulation of this challenge becomes a central task of
the interagency system.
The interagency system's efforts to socialize new members
involves transmittal of three expectations. New members are
expected to accept (1) their limited jurisdictions without trying to
expand them in ways that further impinge on other's territories,
(2) the existing power structure in social services, and (3) the
prevalent leadership style of consensus politics.
The processes by which expectations are transmitted is subtle
and frequently invisible. It becomes highly visible, however, when
sanctions are invoked against new agencies that fail to become
properly socialized. The most striking illustration of this process
is a Native-run social agency's relations in the interagency system,
both in planning groups and in the larger social service community.
Challenge to the Interagency System
In 1970, encouraged by Nixon's policy statement on Indian selfdetermination and the Bureau of Indian Affairs' policy regarding
contracting Bureau services to Indian groups, Cook Inlet Native
Association, the largest Native organization in the state, sought to
establish itself as a provider of social services for Natives. To
this end, it applied for a contract to operate the Bureau's general
relief program and later, for the Bureau's employment assistance
program. Neither of these contracts was awarded. But in 1972, the
now defunct Anchorage Community Action Agency funded Cook Inlet
Native Association to operate an urban Native center. The Urban
Native Center subsequently received a Bureau contract to operate a
transportation service for enrollees in a manpower training program
and an Indian Health Service contract to administer the health aide
program in the Cook Inlet region. With these contracts and with
funds from the Community Action Agency which enabled it to establish
social service, manpower and airport assistance programs as well as
a craft shop and recreation center, Urban Native Center was in business. But the Center was not satisfied with this narrow juris-440-

diction. Conceiving itself as a comprehensive social service, it
sought additional funds and contracts for providing more services
regardless of the extant distribution of service domains.
The Center posed a strong challenge to the existing power
structure in the social service community when it assumed leadership
for organizing a planning council without consulting recognized and
established agency leaders. Shortly after this effort by the Center,
established agencies joined forces and organized a competitive
group, the Social Service Planning Group, which ultimately absorbed
the one started by the Center. Center representatives' activity in
the new group continued to challenge the status quo. For instance,
Center representatives demanded the establishment of a low income
board. Since the new group was established in part to ward off
control by low income groups such as the Center, it was not likely
to support the proposal for a low income board. Nevertheless,
because it is unpopular to oppose participation by the poor, members
of the new group did not openly reject the proposal. Instead, they
covertly subverted it by failing to follow through on the plan for
each member to bring low income persons to subsequent meetings.
The Center challenged the status quo in interagency power in
other ways. At the same time that it held a Bureau contract, the
Center's regional corporation filed a suit against the Bureau's
parent organization, Department of the Interior, regarding a land
claims suit. Center leaders thought this act may have seriously
alienated the Bureau.
The Center's conflicts were not confined to older established
agencies; they also occurred with more recent agencies such as the
Community Action Agency. The latter had also been a "have-not"
agency, but at the time of this study, having gained some acceptance
by the established social service community, it tended to behave
similarly to it when dealing with the Native Center. Although Community Action was only one of the Center's funding sources, it
insisted on having the authoritative role. The Center objected to
this. One conflict between the two groups centered around firing
prerogatives. Both groups insisted on having the final authority
to hire and fire Center personnel. Another conflict concerned the
composition of the Center's Board of Directors. Ironically, at the
same time that the Center was agitating the Social Service Planning
Group to establish a low income board, the Community Action Agency
was demanding greater representation by the poor on the Center's
Board. The Center considered its all-Native board about as representative of Alaskan poor as a board can be; the Community Action
Agency, however, required the Center board to have 51 percent poor
instead of the usual one-third poor, and to have actual poor instead
of the usual requirement for representatives of the poor.
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In addition to challenging the power structure in the interagency system, the Native Center also violated the prevailing style
of consensus politics by playing a defiant, truth-teller role.
Although Community Action Agency staff frequently played a similar
role, its leadership was unwilling to accept defiance from its
delegate agency, expecting Center representatives to be appreciative
supplicants. When Center representatives charged the Community
Action Agency with imposing impossible standards regarding a low
income board and subjecting them to undue harrassment, a Community
Action Agency official asked them how they dared defy him when he
controlled the purse strings. "We'll give it a darn good try," a
Center official replied. In recounting this incident to me, the
Community Action Agency official cast out his arms in a gesture of
despair, saying:
"How can they be so foolish as to bite the hand that feeds
them? It would be irresponsible for me to continue funding
people who don't know how to get along in this world. I
think I'll freeze their funds."
And forthwith, he did just that.
Clearly, the Native Center was not behaving in conformity with
the roles prescribed for it. It would not accept a role as supplicant, appreciative of the limited jurisdiction it had gained. It
challenged the existing power structure in the interagency system.
And it would not accept the prevailing leadership style of pretending
a harmony that did not exist.
Interagency Sanctioning System
In response to this socialization failure, the interagency
system invoked sanctions against the Center. While it is difficult
to prove that a particular outcome is due to a specific sanction,
the combined effects of agency responses to the Center in 1973 were
to threaten its very survival.
The most potent sanction, of course, is defunding. After freezing, then restoring, then threatening defunding for 1973, the
Community Action Agency finally gave the Center reduced funding,
eliminating the Center's social service program, representatives of
which were among the most outspoken challengers of the interagency
status quo.
The Native Center also lost its Bureau of Indian Affairs contract for transportation services, and according to a letter the
Center received from the Bureau in 1973, its applications for con-

tracts to operatd Bureau employment assistance and general relief
programs were not to be granted. After explaining that the Bureau
contracts office was understaffed and unable to process contracts,
the letter states:
...you must certainly be aware of the nature and volume
of work generated by the contract process... in your
interests and ours, we have no wish to initiate an
enterprise destined to failure (Bureau of Indian Affairs
Juneau Area Office to Anchorage Urban Native Center, July
6, 1973).
Further, all seventeen proposals for services submitted by the
Center to funding agencies were rejected. Speculating about the
reasons for the uniform rejections, a Center official said, "I think
our troubles began after our regional corporation filed a legal suit
against the Department of Interior."
Defunding and rejection of proposals are not the only sanctions
applied against the Center. A campaign of gossip to discredit the
Center was widespread within social service circles. Although
charges against the Center concerned events that are common in all
agencies, they were presented as uncontroverted evidence of the
Center's incompetence. When asked about the Center, many administrators and staff rejoined with accusations against it. Said one
administrator:
"They're sick, they're devious. It's because they are
so insecure. They're not trained, you know, and that
makes them supersensitive and defensive."
Lack of training and incompetence were common charges against the
Center staff, yet the majority of people implementing social services
in Anchorage are not trained social workers. Agencies seem to have
little trouble accepting untrained personnel in their own agencies,
and incompetence has not become an issue in those agencies. Another
charge against the Center focused on conflict between Center administrators and a Center staff member. This conflict was a major topic
of conversation in social service circles and was treated as a unique
phenomenon, yet I encountered no agencies that were free of internal
conflict.
This discrediting tactic against the Native Center proved very
effective. Few agencies referred clients there. When asked about
their reasons for failing to refer clients to the Center, respondents
invoked the standard criticism of incompetence and lack of training
(few had ever visited the Center). In effect, then, a boycott was
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imposed against the Center, weakening its potential for attracting
new funds and contracts.
Later, after the research for this study was completed, the
local sanctions against the Native Center became ineffective because
of federal policies. The growing federal emphasis on Indian selfdetermination proved a more powerful factor than the local interagency system, and funds from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian
Health Services, and other federal agencies became available to the
Native Center. Without these federal policies, the Native Center
would not likely have survived.
In sum, the sanctioning system in the Anchorage interagency
system operates both formally and informally, and the two modes are
closely intertwined and complementary. Funding and contractor
agencies impaired the Center's functioning by withdrawing or refusing funds, and the informal interagency system further undermined
the Center by a discrediting tactic that stigmatized the Center and
excluded it from the interagency referral system.
The Anchorage interagency system, in both formal planning and
informal agency relations, is engaged in a very active process of
regulating behavior of member agencies. This regulation serves to
protect the interests of established agencies in the community more
than to promote the express goals of planning -- integrating and
rationalizing social services. Planning tends to assume the form
of a ritual not because bureaucrats have a special inclination for
ceremonies but because of the predominance of their interests in
protecting their domains and the interorganizational status quo. The
social service community operates as an interagency system in socializing members to the realities of interagency power and the norms of
consensus politics, and regulates behavior by imposing sanctions
against recalcitrant or rebellious members.
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